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Abstract 
While progress in developing countries as a whole, in terms of growth, poverty reduction, and several 
MDGs, has been quite good in recent years, fragile states lag behind in levels of MDG achievement. 
To understand the link between fragility and MDG progress, and also to identify the most effective 
policy interventions to achieve the MDGs, it is essential that fragile states are appropriately defined 
and classified. While the amount of literature on how to engage with fragile states is rapidly 
accumulating, only very limited analysis exists that investigates to what extent the levels and trends in 
the MDGs differ significantly between different definitions of fragile and non-fragile states. The 
purpose of this paper is to investigate the usefulness of the fragile state concept in tracking the levels 
and progress of the MDGs. In doing so, this paper applies several definitions of fragility in order to 
study the MDG progress between 1990 and 2006. It compares aver-age performance in levels and 
trends of MDG progress between fragile and non-fragile countries and also compares within-group 
heterogeneity. The paper shows that fragile countries are, indeed, performing worse in terms of MDG 
levels. In terms of MDG progress, progress is not necessarily slower in fragile states. Only a rather 
small number of countries suffering from compound disadvantages are doing significantly worse in 
terms of MDG progress. Lastly, the heterogeneity of MDG performance among fragile states is so 
large that it is not very useful to treat them as a group; the problems they face, as well as the solutions 
required, differ greatly and have to be developed and treated sui generis. 
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Last year, the midpoint for reaching the Millenium Development Goals (MDG) passed. During the 
last decade, many regions, particular in East and South Asia, experienced major economic and social 
progress towards the achievement of the goals set for 2015, and many households and individuals 
have moved out of the poverty zone. Fragile states, however, lag behind in levels of MDG 
achievement. To understand the link between fragility and MDG progress, it is, therefore, essential 
that fragile states are appropriately defined and classified in order to understand the links between 
fragility and MDG progress, and also to face the challenge of identifying the most effective policy 
interventions to provide the opportunities to achieve the MDGs. 
In recent years, the international community has made a significant effort in attempting to develop 
strategies and instruments that effectively address the severe problems of fragile states (for example, 
the World Bank, 2004; ODI, 2006). This increasing effort can be explained by the need to find new 
ways for donors to engage in their tasks, as the traditional models of aid delivery do not appear to 
work in many fragile states. For example, the capacity to absorb aid is found to be lower in fragile 
states than in non-fragile states (McGillivray and Feeny 2007), while the need for aid is, at the same 
time, considerably greater in fragile states than in non-fragile states. Hence, the main challenge for 
the donor communities is not only to provide more aid to fragile states, but also to provide it in a 
different manner relative to other developing economies (Dollar and Levin 2005). 
While progress in developing countries as a whole, in terms of growth, poverty reduction, and 
several MDGs, had, (prior to the current crisis), been quite good in recent years, and had, indeed, 
been excellent in quite a few of them, the term “fragile states” has been coined to refer to a group of 
countries in which progress in development has been much poorer, and/or has sometimes been hardly 
visible at all; this is shown again in the recently published Global Monitoring Report (World Bank, 
2009).
2 Initially, the focus of the fragile states agenda was largely on conflict and post-conflict 
countries, following the pioneering work of Collier and his co-authors on the economic costs of 
conflicts (for example, Collier and Hoeffler, 1998). To this, a group of countries was added, in which 
the state had basically ceased to function, or in which the writ of the state did not extend much 
beyond the capital city. Lastly, this discussion began to relate to an overlapping (but larger) group of 
countries, which the World Bank referred to as “low income countries under stress” (LICUS). The 
identification tool for this particular group of countries was the World Bank’s Country Performance 
Institutional Assessment (CPIA) rating, the confidential multi-component institutional performance 
index of the World Bank, which is also used to decide upon IDA allocations. Recently, these concepts 
have all been merged into the term “fragile states”, which were held to be the states most in difficulty 
in making any MDG progress, states in which particular approaches are needed, and states for which 
special attention is critical. The concept is akin to the “bottom billion” (Collier 2007) applied to 
states. 
While the amount of literature on how to engage with fragile states is rapidly accumulating (for 
example, the World Bank, 2004, 2006; DFID, 2006, OECD 2008, 2009), only very limited analysis 
that investigates to what extent the levels and trends in the MDGs differ significantly between fragile 
                                                      
*  Paper prepared for the Conference on “The challenges of fragility to development pol-icy”, organised by the European 
Report of Development in Barcelona, Spain, 7-8 May, 2009. 
1   Acknowledgements: this paper greatly benefited from discussions with François Bourguignon, Giorgia Giovanetti, Jann 
Lay, Janvier Nkuruziza and participants at the ERD Meeting on Fragility and Conflict in Barcelona. Funding from the 
EU via the ERD is gratefully acknowledged. 
2   The GMR 2009 (nor the one in 2008) do not provide any definition of the term fragile state and none is available after 
2007 on the World Bank website. Presumably, fragility is defined using the CPIA score (see below). Kenneth Harttgen and Stephan Klasen 
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and non-fragile states exists.
3 Undoubtedly, fragile countries within this category are, indeed, likely to 
face serious development challenges. But the question is whether the concept of “fragile” states, 
which combines different sets of countries, is a useful one, in the sense that their performance in 
terms of the levels and trends with regard to the MDGs is, indeed, relatively homogenous, and clearly 
distinguishable from the group of non-fragile countries. It is important to address this rather straight-
forward question regarding the usefulness of the fragility measure as a predictor of development 
outcomes in terms of the MDGs, because, regardless of the definition of fragile states, these countries 
are generally characterised by a poor performance of policies, institutions and governments, which 
worsen their prospects for achieving the MDGs. Thus, “fragility” is commonly associated with poor 
MDG levels and trends, but this is never carefully scrutinised. Nor is it clear that grouping a rather 
heterogeneous set of countries under one label is a helpful characterisation. 
The purpose of this paper is to investigate the usefulness of the fragile state concept in tracking the 
levels and progress of the MDGs. In doing so, this paper applies several definitions of fragility (from 
DFID and from several based upon the World Bank’s CPIA) to study the MDG progress between 
1990 and 2006. It will both compare average performance in levels and trends of MDG progress 
between fragile and non-fragile countries as well as compare within-group heterogeneity. The main 
regional focus in analysing fragile states in this paper is Sub-Saharan Africa, since this is the region 
that is most strongly affected by poverty, and many of its countries suffer from fragility and macro-
economic vulnerability. The paper will show that fragile countries are, indeed, performing worse in 
terms of MDG levels. In terms of MDG progress, progress is not necessarily slower in fragile states 
(and sometimes might be even better). Only a rather small number of countries suffering from 
compound disadvantages are doing significantly worse in terms of MDG progress. Lastly, the 
heterogeneity of the MDG performance among fragile states is so large that it is not very useful to 
treat them as a group; the problems they face, as well as the solutions required, differ greatly and have 
to be developed and treated sui generis. 
First, this paper provides a short overview of the concept of fragile states used for the analyses. 
Second, it gives a brief overview of the current situation in the MDGs. Third, it investigates the levels 
and progress in the MDGs separately by fragility status and by various fragility definitions in order to 
capture the country-specific heterogeneity of “fragile countries” in MDG performance. Fourth, it 
discusses possible explanations of the heterogeneity in the levels and progress towards the MDGs in 
terms of fragility status. 
2. Concepts, definitions and lists of Fragile States 
Fragile states are characterised by weak institutions and by their vulnerability to violent conflicts, and 
have increasingly become the central focus of the development community in recent years. The 
factors which lead to state fragility are diverse and manifest themselves in a variety of forms. Hence, 
the fragile state agenda is very broadly-defined in terms of the emphasis on human security and 
peace-building, the concern with poor development performance and state effectiveness, and the 
concern for the relationship between under-development and insecurity. 
In recent years, a large body of literature has attempted to conceptualise and to define fragile states 
(for example, Stewart and Brown, 2009; the World Bank 2006; ODI, 2006). However, a uniform 
approach is hindered by both a lack of information and a suitable framework to classify “fragile 
states”. In addition, many definitions do not take account of the structural causes for fragility, not do 
they differentiate between short-term shocks and long-term persistence in individual fragile states. 
                                                      
3   This is apart from the mention of the differences in MDG performance in the Global Monitoring Reports (the World 
Bank 2008, 2009). There, neither the definitions of fragility nor the precise calculations of MDG progress are available. 
See, also, a brief discussion on MDG progress in the IEG Report (the World Bank 2006) in which also a relatively large 
amount of heterogeneity in MDG performance is shown. Fragility and MDG Progress: How Useful is the Fragility Concept? 
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As a rather new concept, it has generated a host of definitions, which, according to an ODI (2006) 
report, can be grouped into definitions that focus on weak capacity or will, weak output, or difficult 
donor relationships. Box 1 summarises a few approaches to defining fragile states. This report also 
includes several lists of countries which are deemed as fragile by some of the institutions listed 
below, some of which will be used in the present analysis. These lists sometimes use objective 
criteria, sometimes value-judgement seems to be involved, and, sometimes, a set of proxies is used to 
generate the list (see, also, Bourguignon et al., 2008). 
The World Bank generated a list of fragile states using the Country Policy and Institutional 
Assessment (CPIA) rating of countries. The CPIA rates countries against a set of 16 criteria grouped 
into four clusters: (a) economic management (3 indicators); (b) structural policies (3 indicators); (c) 
policies for social inclusion and equity (5 indicators); and (d) public sector management and 
institutions (5 indicators). In these lists, each indicator receives a subjective score of 1 to 6 from the 
World Bank staff members. The overall CPIA is generated by taking the unweighted average of the 
four components, which, in turn, are averages of the sub-components. Countries that score less than 
3.2 on the averaged indicator are defined as fragile states. Appendix A1 shows the components and 
scores for 2007 for IDA countries. Box 2 shows countries that show a CPIA below 3.2 for the years 
2003 to 2007. 
One advantage of this approach is that it is particularly transparent in how fragility is defined. 
Also, as noted by the World Bank IEG Assessment of the World Bank’s work in fragile countries 
(World Bank 2006), it is focused on the institutional and structural features of countries, rather than 
on ex post outcomes. At the same time, there are serious problems with this approach to defining 
fragility, some of which have also been raised by the IEG Report (the World Bank 2006). First, as the 
CPIA data has only been publicly available from 2006 and lists of fragile countries only available 
from 2003, it is not possible to backtrack the fragility definition prior to 2003. Second, the CPIA does 
not include any components relating to security issues, which seems to be an important issue for 
many conflict and post-conflict countries. Third, it is unclear whether the weights used for the CPIA 
and its intended purpose, namely, IDA allocations, are also the right ones for defining fragility. 
Fourth, with this, as with other definitions of fragility, there is considerable change from year to year 
in the CPIA of two types: there are the marginal cases, in which the CPIA hovers around 3.2, and 
then there are the cases in which the CPIA moves rapidly in one or other direction (it moves 
downwards usually faster than upwards; see the discussion in World Bank 2007a). The former case, 
in particular, presents a problem. One possible solution would be to think about the depth of fragility, 
rather than just its incidence, similar to the FGT poverty measures. Lastly, since it is a 16 component 
index, there are many ways to obtain an average score which is below 3.2, and not all of them might 
be as harmful to the MDG progress as others. As is shown in the appendix, in which the individual 
scores of the CPIA countries are listed, it emerges, for example, that Togo ends up as fragile mainly 
because of very poor economic management scores, while Cambodia ends up on the list due poor 
public sector management. This paper considers the different components separately in order to see 
whether they show different correlations with MDG progress. 
Clearly, these different lists also have different purposes in mind, so it might not be surprising that 
they differ in both approach and result. But the implication of these lists is usually that these countries 
are particular laggards in MDG levels and progress, as suggested again in the World Bank’s Global 
Monitoring Report (the World Bank 2009). There is also some empirical evidence from the World 
Bank (the World Bank 2007a, b), which was produced as part of the research programme on IDA 
allocations, that suggests that the CPIA as a measure is, indeed, a good predictor of development 
outcomes, and, thus, that a low CPIA in fragile states should imply poor MDG levels and progress.
4 
Thus, it is, indeed, worthwhile examining to what extent the “fragile” category is, indeed, useful for 
predicting MDG levels and progress. 
                                                      
4   The two papers from the World Bank (2007 a, b) differ in three respects from the study here. First, they treat the CPIA 
as a continuous variable. Second, they drop some observations from their analysis, including some small states and 
transition countries. And, finally, they focus on the HDI and project performance ratings as the main outcome measures. Kenneth Harttgen and Stephan Klasen 
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Box 1: Alternative definitions of “fragile states” 
There are many different approaches to defining and responding to the complex 
development situation referred to under such diverse names as “weak and failing states”, 
“poor performers”, “low-income countries under stress”, “countries at risk of instability”, or 
“fragile states”. Difficult environment countries matter, for different reasons, for a wide 
range of development factors, including NGOs, bilateral donors and international 
organisations, as well as government agencies, such as foreign and defence ministries. It is 
important to state at the outset that the existing terminology, in both English and in other 
languages, does not necessarily refer to states that are unresponsive to the poor. Some may 
be simply poor performers, some may be autocratic, while some may be conflict-ridden. For 
clarity and brevity, the following approaches and definitions are organised around three 
broad categories, based upon their central themes or assumptions: 
1.  Fragile, failed, or crisis states: These approaches are based upon the assessment of a 
state’s strength regarding issues of capabilities, sovereignty and conflict. The USAID’s 
Fragile States Strategy is an example of this approach. 
2.  Poor performing countries: Most of the international financial institutions (IFIs) focus 
their approach to difficult environments on how well a country performs in terms of 
development outcomes, taking into account the quality of the governance and policy 
choices. The World Bank’s low income countries under stress (LICUS) is the most well-
known initiative. 
3.  Difficult aid partners: In this approach, the emphasis is placed on the poor aid 
relationships between donors and recipient states. 
The OECD’s Development Assistance Committee (DAC) and DFID have been the pioneers 
of this approach. 
It is important to note that definitions and approaches inevitably depend on a variety of 
endogenous factors, which originate from the organisations which are trying to form them, 
such as national interests, views on sovereignty and international jurisdiction, stance on 
impartiality versus effectiveness, institutional mandates and incentives, tools and practices, 
and regional scope. However, the fact that the list of fragile states - seen at one point of 
time - differs substantially from one agency to another (see the following paragraphs) 
suggests that subjectivity matters a great deal in appraising whether or not a state is 
“fragile”. 
Some formal definitions of fragile states 
OECD-DAC 
The Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the Organisation for Economic Co-
operation (OECD) refers to a continuum of countries considered as “difficult partnerships” 
due to a combination of: 
1.  a lack of political interest in poverty reduction; and 
2.  weak state and/or non-state institutional capacity to implement policy. 
This means that the usual DAC partnership model does not work, and results in poor aid 
relationships between the donors and recipient states. The DAC approach explains difficult 
partnerships as arising when development objectives play little role compared with the 
prolongation of power, with the result that partner governments do not have a credible 
commitment to effective policies and to their implementation. The response needs to be 
focused around three priority areas: 
1.  promoting pro-poor change; 
2.  maintaining development activities; and 
3.  adopting donor co-ordination, and enhancing policy coherence. 
This approach is not restricted to any specific group of countries, and common 
characteristics include: 
1.  poor governance (conflict or post-conflict situations, corruption, lack of transparency, 
human rights violations); Fragility and MDG Progress: How Useful is the Fragility Concept? 
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2.  lack of political commitment to pursue poverty reduction; 
3.  lack of capacity to develop and implement policies (both nationally and 
internationally); 
4.  poor working relationship with donors. 
The main advantage is its emphasis on partnerships and incentives for better aid. Its 
disadvantage is a lack of objectively measurable criteria. 
DFID 
The DFID defines as fragile those countries for which the government cannot or will not 
deliver core functions to the majority of its people, including the poor. The most important 
functions of the state, for poverty reduction, are territorial control, safety and security, 
capacity to manage public resources, the delivery of basic services, and the ability to protect 
and support the ways in which the poorest people sustain themselves. The DFID does not 
limit its definition of fragile states to those affected by conflict. 
USAID 
The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) has recently come up with 
a “Fragile States Strategy”, which offers three operationally-relevant definitions for failing, 
failed and recovering states. The approach to assessing state fragility focuses on a state’s 
effectiveness (the degree of administrative capacity and the amount of resources) and 
legitimacy (the degree of perceived justice or fairness in the exercise of power), by 
measuring four key dimensions: political, economic, social, and security. 
Although this approach provides a dynamic explanation for state crisis, and points to the 
need for linkages between integrated sector analyses (in a so-called “Fragility Framework”) 
and decision-making, the emphasis seems to be placed on security, conflict management 
and state capacity-building. In addition, by integrating legitimacy into the assessment 
model, issues of inclusion and equity are brought to the forefront, in trying to address 
causes and incentives. But one disadvantage is that effectiveness does not seem to be 
sufficiently disaggregated in order to understand the difference between ability and 
willingness. 
The World Bank 
The World Bank’s LICUS initiative (Low Income Countries Under Stress) defines these as 
being characterised by very weak policies, institutions and governance. Aid does not work 
well in these environments because governments lack the capacity or the inclination to use 
finance effectively for poverty reduction. The LICUS approach entails engaging in a dialogue 
with the government, anchoring strategies in stronger political and economic analyses, 
promoting domestic demand and capacity for positive change, supporting simple and feasible 
entry-level reforms, and exploring innovative mechanisms for social service delivery. There 
seem to be two distinct LICUS environments: post-conflict and non post-conflict, but there is 
no definitive list of LICUS countries. The main advantages to this approach are that it 
emphasises engaging with these countries differently, and also stresses the importance of 
measurable indicators for donor decision-making. The main disadvantage of the World 
Bank’s LICUS classification is that the LICUS list is not publicly available, and the 
classification is based upon the World Bank’s own Country Policy and Institutional 
Assessment (CPIA) system. 
CPIA scores divide low-income countries into five categories of performance, the lowest 
two of which are useful proxies for state fragility. The CPIA rates countries against a set of 
16 criteria grouped in four clusters: 
1.  economic management; 
2.  structural policies; 
3.  policies for social inclusion and equity; 
4.  public sector management and institutions. 
Those indicators are reported by the local World Bank staff, based upon their own 
knowledge and understanding of the economic functioning of the country. There is a 
separate group of unranked countries, also deemed fragile. This provides a list of 46 fragile 
states, containing 870 million people or 14% of the world’s population. Kenneth Harttgen and Stephan Klasen 
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The list of “fragile countries” according to the World Bank definitions 
The table below shows the list of fragile states used by the World Bank as of 2007. The 
correlation between this list and the lists proposed by other agencies tends to be quite high, 
but is far from perfect. 
Fragile states according to the DFID and the World Bank definitions 
CPIA 2007: Afghanistan, Angola, Burundi, Cambodia, Central African Republic, Chad, 
Republic of Congo, Côte d’Ivoire, Eritrea, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Haiti, Laos, Liberia, 
Mauritania, Myanmar, Nigeria, Papua New Guinea, Sierra Leone, Somalia, the Sudan, Togo, 
Uzbekistan, Zimbabwe, and the Territory of Kosovo 
Small states (population less than 2 million): The Gambia, São Tomé and Principe, the 
Solomon Islands, Timor-Leste, Tonga, and Vanuatu. 
Source: Bourguignon et al., (2008). 
3. Differences in Lists of fragile states across definitions and across time 
Typically, the fragility status persists for a long period of time. Once a country reaches the cut-off 
point and is considered as a fragile state, it remains in this condition for a considerable length of time. 
This has important consequences for the development of the country. Looking, for example, at 
countries that have recently become fragile states, such as Sierra Leone and Djibouti, it is unlikely 
that they will emerge from this condition within the next few years. 
A useful pre-requisite for examining the utility of the fragile states concept is that there should be 
some agreement as to how countries come to be placed on this list and a certain stability of these lists 
over time. However, one should not take this point to the extreme. Clearly, lists will differ as they try 
to measure different aspects of fragility (as discussed above), and, ideally, we would all want the lists 
of fragile states to become smaller as time goes on, maybe as a result of donor efforts. But it should 
not be mainly arbitrary which countries are on such a list; also, in addition, very high fluctuations 
might also make such lists not very useful, as international and donor engagement with a rapidly 
shifting target is somewhat challenging. 
The different classifications and definitions of fragile states have been criticised for several 
reasons. Countries that score poorly in one dimension, but better in others, often fail to be listed as 
fragile. For example, some countries are completely missing from the lists even though there is a high 
risk on conflict. The current situation in Pakistan might be a good case in point. Furthermore, the 
current existing classifications do not account for important basic characteristics of fragile states, such 
as their conflict history, i.e., whether countries are currently at conflict or whether countries are in a 
post-conflict re-construction phase, which might have important implications for their performance 
capacity to reach the MDGs. 
Box 2 below shows different lists using definitions by the DFID and various versions and years of 
the World Bank’s CPIA. In particular, the Box 2 presents the CPIA lists of fragile states for the years 
2006 and 2007, for each sub-indicator (Economic Management, Structural Policies, Social 
Inclusion/Equity, Public Management), core fragile states (those that appear on the list every year 
between 2003 and 2007, and temporary fragile states (those that appeared at least once on the list 
between 2003 and 2007). In addition, Box 2 also shows the countries that fall short of the CPIA score 
in all sub-categories.
5 
While, for eight countries, all definitions converge, and these countries were also classified as 
fragile every year between 2003 and 2007, there are plenty of countries that appear on different lists. 
                                                      
5   Just recently, the World Bank published the 2008 CPIA list, which shows only minor changes to the 2007 list. In 
particular, five additional countries appear on the 2008 list: Cameroon, Kiribati, Nepal, Tajikistan, and Yemen. Vanuatu 
is not on the 2008 list, although it was considered a fragile state in 2007. Fragility and MDG Progress: How Useful is the Fragility Concept? 
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In particular, the DFID list (based upon ODI, 2006)
6 as well as the social inclusion component of the 
World Bank’s CPIA both yield particularly large lists. 
Concentrating first on the CPIA list 2007, around three quarters of the 33 countries on the list are 
“affected by an on-going armed conflict” (the World Bank 2006, Uppsala Conflict Database
7). Since 
the 1950s, 78 countries in Africa have been the subject of armed conflict or are still in a conflict 
situation (Uppsala Conflict Database). Armed conflicts are one of the major reasons why fragile 
stages lag so far behind the MDGs. The cost of conflicts can be very high, both in terms of the deaths 
of the current living population, and in terms of physical damage which negatively affects the growth 
perspective of such economies (Chauvet and Collier 2004). 
Twenty-one countries on the CPIA 2007 list are African countries (Angola, Burundi, Central 
African Republic, Chad, the Republic of Congo, Côte d’ Ivoire, Djibouti, Eritrea, the Gambia, 
Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mauritania, Nigeria, São Tomé and Principe, Sierra Leone, Somalia, 
the Sudan, Togo, and Zimbabwe). The longest list is that based upon the DFID classification, which 
contains 42 countries. However, regardless of which classification is taken as a basis, all countries on 
the lists have common characteristics: weak state policies and institutions, which result in a limited 
capacity to provide public goods and services, and, even if not at conflict right now, at high risk of 
conflict and political instability. 
The group of countries that are most affected by state fragility, with regard to these lists, are the 
two groups of countries that are either fragile based upon poor CPIA performance every year between 
2003 and 2007, or show a CPIA score below 3.2 in every single sub-dimension of the CPIA 
classification (Economic Management, Structural Policies, Social Inclusion/Equity, Public 
Management) in 2007. These two groups show a clear common pattern: most are from Sub-Saharan 
Africa. With the except of Afghanistan, the Solomon Islands, Timor-Leste, Haiti, Laos, and 
Myanmar, all of the fragile states that fall below the cut-off point in all CPIA categories or are 
classified as “core” fragile states are Sub-Saharan African countries. Specifically, the group of “all 
categories” fragile states includes Angola, the Central African Republic, Comoros, the Republic of 
Congo, Eritrea, the Solomon Islands, the Sudan, and Zimbabwe. The group of “core” fragile states 
includes the African countries: Angola, Burundi, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Guinea-Bissau, 
Liberia, Somalia, the Sudan, and Zimbabwe. Also striking, with regard to the regional concentration 
of fragile states, is the list of countries that appears on all the lists of fragile states, where, once again, 
countries from Sub-Saharan Africa dominate. 
To analyse the relationship between the classifications of fragile states and the MDG outcomes, 
this paper concentrates particularly on the countries that were “core” or “severely” fragile in every 
year between 2003 and 2007 (i.e., they had a CPIA below 3 in each of those years; see the World 
Bank, 2006); those that were fragile in each sub-component (i.e., scored 3.2 on average in the four 
components), or were fragile using any of the four components.
8 The shortest list is the one in which 
a country scores poorly on all components of the CPIA and this list includes almost only countries 
that are included on all the other lists, suggesting a somewhat robust categorisation. Regarding time 
trends, they can only be considered using the CPIA. Taking the years 2003-2006, 12 countries are on 
the list in all these years (and this excludes marginal cases in which the CPIA was around 3.2), while 
another 27 were considered fragile at one point during those four years. Thus, here, too, there is an 
inter-temporally robust core which, as to be expected, is quite similar to the core using all 4 CPIA 
components, while there is large amount of fluctuations surrounding this core. This could well affect 
the assessment of MDG progress by category. 
                                                      
6   The ODI list is also related to the CPIA, but focuses on countries which were in the worst quintile of the CPIA for some 
period of time. 
7   http://www.pcr.uu.se/gpdatabase/search.php. 
8   The DFID list is not such a dissimilar approach from the CPIA as it defines countries as fragile if they were in the worst 
and second worst quintile of the CPIA between 1999 and 2003. Kenneth Harttgen and Stephan Klasen 
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DFID    
Afghanistan Afghanistan  Angola  Afghanistan Afghanistan Afghanistan Angola  Afghanistan Cambodia  Afghanistan  Comoros 
Angola Angola  CAR  Angola Angola Angola CAR  Angola  Cameroon  Angola  Djibouti 
Burundi Burundi  Chad  Burundi Cameroon  Bangladesh  Chad  Burundi  CAR  Azerbaijan Dominica 
Cambodia Cambodia  Comoros CAR  CAR  Burundi  Comoros 
Dem. Rep. 
Congo  Chad  Burundi Gambia,  The 
CAR CAR 
Republic of 






Congo  Cambodia Guyana 
Congo, Dem. 
Rep.  Chad  Côte d'Ivoire  Comoros Comoros Cameroon  Eritrea  Haiti Côte  d'Ivoire  Cameroon  Kiribati 
Comoros 
Republic of 




Rep.  CAR 
Solomon 
Islands  Liberia  Eritrea CAR 
São Tomé 
and Principé 




Congo.  Chad Sudan,  The  Laos PDR  Guinea  Chad 
Solomon 
Islands 




Congo.  Timor Leste 
Guinea Côte  d'Ivoire  Guinea Kiribati  Djibouti 
Congo, Dem. 
Rep.  Zimbabwe  Somalia Niger    Côte  d'Ivoire  Tonga 
Guinea-Bissau Djibouti  Guinea-Bissau  Laos  PDR  Eritrea 
Republic of 
Congo     Sudan, The  Nigeria  Eritrea  Vanuatu 
Haiti  Eritrea  Maldives Sierra  Leone  Gambia, The  Côte d'Ivoire     Zimbabwe 
Papua New 
Guinea Ethiopia     
Laos PDR  Gambia, The 
São Tomé and 
Principe 
Solomon 
Islands  Guinea  Djibouti        Sierra Leone  Georgia    
Liberia Guinea 
Solomon 
Islands  Sudan, The  Guinea-Bissau  Eritrea        Tajikistan  Guinea    
Myanmar Guinea-Bissau  Sri  Lanka  Timor-Leste  Haiti  Gambia, The       
Territory of 
Kosovo  Haiti    
Nigeria Haiti  Sudan, The  Uzbekistan  Kiribati  Guinea        Timor-Leste  Indonesia    
Solomon 
Island  Laos PDR  Timor-Leste Zimbabwe Niger  Guinea-Bissau        Togo  Kenya    
Somalia  Liberia  Togo     Pakistan  Guyana        Uzbekistan  Laos PDR    
Sudan  Mauritania Tonga     
Papua New 
Guinea  Haiti       
West Bank and 
the Gaza strip  Liberia    
Timor-Leste  Myanmar  Zimbabwe    
São Tomé and 
Principe  Kyrgyz Republic        Yemen  Mali    

































DFID    
Vanuatu 
Papua New 
Guinea       
Solomon 
Islands  Mauritania        Djibouti  Niger    
Zimbabwe 
São Tomé and 
Principe        Sudan, The  Nigeria        Equ. Guinea  Nigeria    
Kosovo  Sierra Leone        Timor-Leste 
Papua New 
Guinea        Gambia, The 
Papua New 
Guinea    
  
Solomon 
Island        Togo 
Sao Tome and 
Principe       
Sao Tome and 
Principe  Sierra Leone    
   Somalia        Vanuatu  Sierra Leone       
Solomon 
Islands  Somalia    
   Sudan        Yemen, Rep. 
Solomon 
Islands        Vanuatu Sudan    
   Timor-Leste        Zimbabwe Sudan          Tajikistan    
   Togo           Tajikistan           Uzbekistan    
   Vanuatu           Timor-Leste           Yemen, Rep.    
   Uzbekistan           Togo           Zimbabwe    
   Zimbabwe           Tonga                
   Kosovo           Uzbekistan                
               Vanuatu                
               Yemen, Rep.                
               Zimbabwe                
Note: Countries in bold appear on all lists. Kenneth Harttgen and Stephan Klasen 
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4. The Millennium Development Goals: Where do we stand? 
Agreed upon by the International Community in the year 2000, the Millennium Development Goals 
(MDGs) are the very promising expression of the international development community for the fight 
against poverty in its many dimensions. The MDGs consist of eighty main goals to be reached by the 
year 2015, including halving world income poverty and hunger, reaching universal primary 
education, reducing child and maternal mortality by two thirds, and halving the number of people 
who suffer from bad access to safe drinking water and sanitation. All MDGs, with their respective 
targets, are listed in Box 3. 
Box 3: Millennium Development Goals 
Goal 1: Eradicate extreme poverty and hunger 
Target 1.A: Halve, between 1990 and 2015, the proportion of people whose income is 
less than one dollar a day 
Target 1.B: Achieve full and productive employment and decent work for all, including 
women and young people (added in 2005) 
Target 1.C: Halve, between 1990 and 2015, the proportion of people who suffer from 
hunger 
Goal 2: Achieve universal primary education 
Target 2.A: Ensure that, by 2015, children everywhere, boys and girls alike, will be 
able to complete a full course of primary schooling 
Goal 3: Promote gender equality and empower women 
Target 3.A: Eliminate gender disparity in primary and secondary education, preferably 
by 2005, and in all levels of education no later than 2015 
Goal 4: Reduce child mortality 
Target 4.A: Reduce by two-thirds, between 1990 and 2015, the under-five mortality 
rate 
Goal 5: Improve maternal health 
Target  5.A:  Reduce by three quarters, between 1990 and 2015, the maternal 
mortality ratio 
Target 5.B:  Achieve, by 2015, universal access to reproductive health (added in 2005) 
Goal 6: Combat HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases 
Target 6.A:  Have halted by 2015 and begun to reverse the spread of HIV/AIDS 
Target 6.B: Achieve, by 2010, universal access to treatment for HIV/AIDS for all those 
who need 
Target 6.C: Have halted by 2015 and begun to reverse the incidence of malaria and 
other major diseases 
Goal 7: Ensure environmental sustainability 
Target 7.A: Integrate the principles of sustainable development into country policies 
and programmes and reverse the loss of environmental resources 
Target 7.B: Reduce biodiversity loss, achieving, by 2010, a significant reduction in the 
rate of loss (added in 2005) 
Target  7.C: Halve, by 2015, the proportion of people without sustainable access to 
safe drinking water and basic sanitation 
Goal 8: Develop a global partnership for development 
Target  8.A:  Develop further an open, rule-based, predictable, non-discriminatory 
trading and financial system. Includes a commitment to good governance, 
development and poverty reduction – both nationally and internationally Fragility and MDG Progress: How Useful is the Fragility Concept? 
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Target 8.B: Address the special needs of the least developed countries. Includes: tariff 
and quota free access for the least developed countries' exports; 
enhanced programme of debt relief for heavily indebted poor countries 
(HIPC) and cancellation of official bilateral debt; and more generous ODA 
for countries committed to poverty reduction 
Target  8.C: Address the special needs of landlocked developing countries and small 
island developing States (through the Programme of Action for the 
Sustainable Development of Small Island Developing States and the 
outcome of the twenty-second special session of the General Assembly) 
Target  8.D:  Deal comprehensively with the debt problems of developing countries 
through national and international measures in order to make debt 
sustainable in the long term 
Source: United Nations (2005). 
The 2008 MDG Monitoring Report reveals the latest levels and progress towards the MDGs (United 
Nations 2008). Looking at the first development goal, the world is going to reach the goal of halving 
global poverty by 2015. In the last few years (prior to the current crisis), GDP per capita growth has 
accelerated in many developing countries. Besides reduction in monetary poverty, progress has also 
been made concerning the other goals. For example, the proportion of people who suffer from hunger 
has decreased from 33 percent in 1990 to 26 percent in 2006, corresponding to a decrease of 22 
percent. Considerable overall progress in the developing regions has also been made in the goal of 
achieving universal primary education. The primary education completion rate reached 88 percent in 
the year 2006. Also child mortality was reduced within the period of 1990-2006, while an 
improvement in maternal health was achieved and the infection rates of HIV/AIDS were reduced 
(United Nations 2008). 
However, when looking at global progress, it is important to emphasise that the MDGs are 
understood and interpreted as country specific goals in order to avoid that progress of countries with 
large populations, such as India or China, is not being interpreted as an overall success towards the 
achievements of the goals, while many other countries are failing to meet the goals. There is a strong 
regional pattern in progress towards the MDGs, and inequalities between regions remain a major 
concern. In particular, the persistent shortfalls in many indicators of poverty in Sub-Saharan African 
remain a major concern regarding the attainment of the goals by 2015. In particular, Sub-Saharan 
Africa is off-track in most of the MDGs, although some countries have experienced a period of high 
growth rates in GDP per capita. For example, Sub-Saharan Africa has only made little improvement 
towards reaching the goal of halving the proportion of people who suffer from hunger. Between 1990 
and 2006, the share was decreased by 4 percentage points, from 32 to 28 per cent. While considerable 
progress was made towards the goal of universal primary education, Sub-Saharan Africa is far from 
reaching this goal. The same holds for the health indicator as well as for the infrastructure indicator. 
While child mortality rates decreased in nearly all the developing regions, it remains very high in 
Sub-Saharan Africa, where about twice as many children die before reaching the age of five, in 
comparison with the average of all the developing countries. In 2006, 157 out of 1,000 children did 
not reach the age of five in Sub-Saharan Africa. Only 31 per cent of the population in Sub-Saharan 
Africa had access to safe drinking water in the year 2006. The situation is even more alarming 
concerning the HIV/AIDS epidemic and its consequences on human well-being and economic 
development. Although the rates of new infections have started to decline in many countries in recent 
years, the number of AIDS deaths is still very high, and has resulted in reducing life expectancy still 
further. Although the overall number of new infections with HIV has decreased in recent years, the 
infection rate has not been reduced at all in Sub-Saharan Africa (United Nations 2008). In short, 
while overall progress has been made towards the achievement of the MDGs, many regions fall 
below most of the targets, headed by Sub-Saharan Africa. Given this situation, it is currently not very 
likely that some countries, especially in Sub-Saharan Africa, will reach the goals. 
In addition, inequality within countries remains a major concern. Improvements in MDGs can be 
achieved while by-passing large shares of the population, depending on how the success and/or Kenneth Harttgen and Stephan Klasen 
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failure is distributed across population sub-groups within countries. Wide disparities in progress 
remain between regions and countries, and, within countries, between population sub-groups, i.e., 
between urban and rural areas, where the latter areas lag considerably behind all targets in almost all 
Sub-Saharan African countries. 
5. MDG levels and fragile states 
One of the main reasons why Sub-Saharan African countries show the lowest levels in the MDG 
indicators is that this region shows the highest share of fragile states in the developing world. This 
was shown in the previous section when looking at the lists of various definitions of the concept of 
fragile states (see Box 2). There is a strong negative correlation between fragility and the MDG levels 
in the fragile states, especially in Sub-Saharan Africa countries furthest away from achieving the 
MDGs by the year 2015. Typically, fragile states in Sub-Saharan Africa started from very low levels 
in the MDGs. In fragile states, the MDG levels are lower, compared to all other developing countries. 
Sub-Saharan Africa fragile states have grown more slowly than non-fragile states in Sub-Saharan 
Africa, and, although the average GDP per capita growth of fragile states has accelerated in recent 
years, it still lags far behind the average of the region. 
To take a closer look at the differences in the levels of MDGs for fragile states and non-fragile 
states, Figure 1 shows, based upon the World Development Indicators 2008, the levels of selected 
MDGs for several groups of fragile and non-fragile states in the year 2006. In particular, it focuses on 
poverty, in childhood under-nutrition, education expansion, and under-five mortality as the indicators 
that are probably best-measured among the MDG indicators.
1 In addition, Figure 1 also presents GDP 
levels. 
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CPIA Non-CPIA CPIA-SSA CPIA-Core CPIA-All DFID SSA Non-SSA
 
Note: CPIA: the fragile states included in the 2007 CPIA list (with a CPIA score of less than 3.2); Non-CPIA: 
non-fragile developing countries; CPIA-SSA: Sub-Saharan African countries included in the 2007 CPIA list; 
CPIA core: countries that appear on the CPIA list every years between 20073 and 2007; CPIA-All: countries 
that show a CPIA score of less than 3.2 on any of the CPIA sub-lists (economic management, structural 
policies, social inclusion/equity, public sector management) in 2007; DFID: countries on the 2007 DFID list; 
SSA: all Sub-Saharan African countries; Non-SSA: Non-Sub-Saharan African developing countries. 
Source: World Development Indicators (2008); own calculations. 
Figure 1 compares fragile states for the following groups of countries: fragile states included in the 
CPIA 2007 list, all non-fragile developing countries, African fragile states based upon the CPIA 2007 
list, the “core” fragile states, the list of countries that show a CPIA score of less than 3.2 in all sub-
indicators of the CPIA classification, the fragile states based upon the DFID list, all Sub-Saharan 
African countries, and all non-Sub-Saharan African developing countries. 
Comparing fragile states with non-fragile states, Figure 1 shows quite clearly that fragility, using 
the World Bank or DFID definition, is clearly associated with much poorer levels of development 
outcomes in 2006. Fragile states based upon all the lists have much lower per capita incomes. 
Regardless of which classification is used, GDP per capita levels in 2006 were very low compared to 
non-fragile states. The poverty headcount in 2006 for the CPIA list of fragile states is more than 3 
times higher than for the non-fragile states. Also, for primary education completion rates, the share of 
children who are underweight, under-five mortality, and the employment to population ratio, Figure 1 
reveals that fragile states are typically worse in terms of poverty levels than non-fragile states, and 
that some systematic difference between fragile and non-fragile states exists. One explanation for this 
is that their low levels of the MDG indicators are often accompanied by low institutional and state 
capacity, and linked to internal conflicts, which hinder the state in providing basic public goods and 
services to the population. 
Comparing the levels of MDGs of the Sub-Saharan African countries in 2006 in Figure 1 with the 
various “fragile states” lists confirms the close relationship between Sub-Saharan Africa and Kenneth Harttgen and Stephan Klasen 
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“fragility”. As a result of the fact that, in all the lists, the majority of countries are from Sub-Saharan 
Africa, the levels of poverty in these classifications are all quite similar. 
Zooming in on the important sub-groups of fragile states, we now concentrate on the more 
restrictive classifications from Box 2. In the figure, it appears that the “core” fragile states and the 
“CPIA all” fragile states indicator definitions seem to be correlated with particularly poor outcomes, 
but this is not invariably the case. For example, the poverty headcount ratio was quite similar in 2006 
between the “core” fragile lists and the total CPIA list. Moreover, this is not surprising as these 
definitions yield the shortest (and somewhat similar) lists. However, fragile states from Sub-Saharan 
Africa are overall worse off than other groups of countries in terms of MDG levels. For example, the 
fragile states from Sub-Saharan Africa top the list of under-five mortality and the employment to 
population ratio. In addition, the “core” fragile states and the “CPIA all” fragile states are more 
clearly distinguishable in terms of their MDG levels than the Sub-Saharan average. 
To confirm the findings from Figure 1 and to provide a closer look at the “CPIA all” list of fragile 
states, Table 1 presents the numbers for MDG levels by fragility status in 2006 for the overall CPIA 
list and also by each CPIA component. 
Table 1: Poverty Indicators for Fragile States Definitions (CPIA) 
















fragile  25.87  15.26 82.33 72.58 4854  CPIA 2007 
fragile 29.01  57.04  69.74  150.29  1476 
non-
fragile  36.46  32.14  77.22  92.80  1993  Economic 
management 
fragile  26.53  26.01  62.56  115.60  2273 
non-
fragile  36.17  32.04 77.99 89.79 2049  Structural 
Policies 
fragile 31.63  29.86  56.50  146.22  1465 
non-
fragile  37.05  33.53  80.25  86.89  2049  Social 
inclusion/equity 
fragile  29.39  19.17  54.72  132.32  1783 
non-
fragile  37.18  29.36 79.27 83.28 2187  Public sector 
management 
fragile 31.23  42.72  67.11  128.20  1429 
non-
fragile  25.97  16.76  81.91  75.30  4680  All categories 
fragile  29.89  62.33  52.02  137.56  2245 
Source: World Development Indicators (2008); own calculations. 
The components of the CPIA address the different performance capacities of a country, economic 
management, structural policies, social inclusion/equity, and public sector management. Focusing on 
the four sub-components of the CPIA, Table 1 shows interesting heterogeneities between different 
MDGs by sub-components and by fragility status. First, Table 1 confirms that MDG achievements are 
generally worse for fragile states than for non-fragile states, regardless of which component of the 
CPIA is examined. An interesting exception is the poverty headcount ratio. Although income levels 
are lower where the CPIA score is lower than 3.2, the poverty headcount is lower for fragile states 
than for non-fragile states using most sub-components of the CPIA. Only for public sector 
management is the poverty headcount higher for the fragile states than for the non-fragile states.
2 
Similarly, fragile states are not doing invariably worse in terms of those underweight. Table 1 shows 
                                                      
2   However, one possible explanation for this is the limited data availability to obtain estimates for the poverty headcount 
for the year 2006, which is not available for all countries. Fragility and MDG Progress: How Useful is the Fragility Concept? 
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no clear pattern to relate a specific MDG to a specific sub-component of the CPIA, i.e., none of the 
sub-components of the CPIA tracks MDG levels invariably better than another, while the combined 
CPIA (either using the average score or the score below 3.2 in each component) invariably shows a 
stronger distinction between fragile and non-fragile countries. This indicates that the total CPIA, 
which uses the average score of the four sub-components, capture the heterogeneity of countries in 
terms of their MDG levels quite well. 
To summarise, regardless of the classification of fragile states used, fragile states lag behind all 
other developing countries in terms of MDGs levels and the situation is considerably worse in Sub-
Saharan Africa. 
6. MDG progress and fragile states 
The Global Monitoring Report 2009 (the World Bank 2009) shows a fairly strong relationship 
between progress in the MDG indicators and fragile states. Compared to middle-income countries and 
low-income countries, fragile states based upon the CPIA classification showed considerably lower 
progress towards the MDGs between 1990 and 2006. This sub-section takes a closer look at several 
classifications of fragile states (Box 2) to investigate whether a systematic difference between fragile 
and non-fragile states exists in terms of progress performance towards the achievement of the MDGs, 
and how useful the classification of fragile states is to monitor progress towards the MDGs for this 
particular group of countries. 
Figure 2 presents the changes in MDGs between the years 2000 and 2006 for the eights groups of 
countries presented in Figure 1.
3 
Given the overall clear pattern that fragile states show a considerably lower level of MDG 
achievements than non-fragile states, Figure 2 shows a different picture in the relationship between 
MDG performance and fragility. When looking at trends in MDG progress over time, there is a great 
heterogeneity across fragile countries, and across indicators within fragile countries, while patterns of 
fragile and non-fragile countries do not show any systematic differences. 
Given the findings of Figure 1, it is thus very surprising that Figure 2 shows little or no correlation 
between fragility and MDG progress, regardless of whether we consider the period of 2000-06, or the 
longer period of 1990-2006 (see Appendix). While it is clear that non-fragile countries and non-Sub-
Saharan African countries did experience higher growth rates, for the other indicators the results are 
less clear. Sometimes, the results are actually exactly the opposite of what one would expect. For 
example, poverty reduction was faster in the fragile countries using the CPIA definition, and 
educational progress was remarkably similar between fragile and non-fragile countries using most 
fragility definitions. The only fragility indicator that seems to be reasonably strongly correlated with 
poorer MDG progress is the CPIA-All indicator, i.e., the one in which fragility is defined as scoring 
less than 3.2 on all components of the CPIA. The “core” countries performed considerably worse in 
all indicators of MDG progress, compared to non-fragile states, but also compared to other fragility 
classifications. 
                                                      
3   Note that the progress in Figure 2 is based upon absolute changes. For respective relative changes and also for the period 
1990-2006, please see Figures A3-A5 in the Appendix. Kenneth Harttgen and Stephan Klasen 
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CPIA Non-CPIA CPIA-SSA CPIA-Core CPIA-All DFID SSA Non-SSA
 
Note: CPIA: fragile states included in the 2007 CPIA list (with a CPIA score of less than 3.2); non-CPIA: non-
fragile developing countries; CPIA-SSA: Sub-Saharan African countries included in the 2007 CPIA list; CPIA 
core: countries that appear on the CPIA list every year between 2003 and 2007; CPIA-All: countries that show 
a CPIA score of less than 3.2 on any of the CPIA sub-lists (economic management, structural policies, social 
inclusion/equity, public sector management) in 2007; DFID: countries included in the 2007 DFID list; SSA: all 
Sub-Saharan African countries; Non-SSA: Non-Sub-Saharan African developing countries. 
For the change in poverty headcount, Argentina and Ukraine are dropped from the sample, because they show 
very large absolute and relative differences, which distort the results of the mean outcomes for the non-CPIA 
countries. 
Source: World Development Indicators (2008); own calculations. 
Figure 3 presents the trends on poverty for the period 1990 to 2006 for the various classifications of 
fragile states. Figure 3 confirms that the fragility definition, using all four components of the CPIA, Fragility and MDG Progress: How Useful is the Fragility Concept? 
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seems to show a markedly different pattern from the other ones, particularly in the post-2000 period, 
which is the period to which the fragility definition referred. 



























































































































































































































































Note: CPIA: fragile states included in the 2007 CPIA list (with a CPIA score of less than 3.2); non-CPIA: non-
fragile developing countries; CPIA-SSA: Sub-Saharan African countries included in the 2007 CPIA list; CPIA 
core: countries that appear on the CPIA list every year between 2003 and 2007; CPIA-All: countries that show 
a CPIA score of less than 3.2 on any of the CPIA sub-lists (economic management, structural policies, social 
inclusion/equity, public sector management) in 2007; DFID: countries included in the 2007 DFID list; SSA: all 
Sub-Saharan African countries; Non-SSA: non-Sub-Saharan African developing countries. 
Source: World Development Indicators (2008); own calculations. 
The findings from Figures 2 and 3 are confirmed by the number of selected MDGs for the years 2000 
and 2006 for three sub-groups Sub-Saharan Africa, the CIPA 2007 fragile states, and the Sub-Saharan 
African fragile states based upon the CPIA 2007 list (see Table 2). Comparing Figure 2 and Table 2, 
the only somewhat-clear trend that was observed for the level in MDGs is that progress towards 
reaching the MDGs in Sub-Saharan Africa is quite similar to the progress of the overall CPIA fragile Kenneth Harttgen and Stephan Klasen 
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list, and that the Sub-Saharan African countries are worse off both in terms of MDG levels as well as 
in terms of MDG progress. 









  2000  2006  2000  2006  2000  2006 
Goal 1: Poverty and Hunger                   
Employment to population ratio, ages 15-24, 
total (%)  53.37  52.44  47.35  46.40  55.35  53.99 
Prevalence of under-nourishment (% of 
population)  .  29.85     29.85  .  23.24 
Poverty headcount ratio at $1 a day (PPP) (% of 
population)   45.77  41.1     41.1  28.44  24.98 
Goal 2: Achieve universal primary education                   
Primary completion rate, total (% of relevant age 
group)  50.26  59.97  67.09  76.56  40.10  61.26 
Total enrolment, primary (% net)  58.53  69.2  75.42  85.48  54.84  69.90 
Goal 3: Promote gender equality and 
empower women                   
Ratio of female to male primary enrolment  86.28  88.65  84.57  93.85  81.76  88.27 
Goal 4: Reduce Child Mortality                   
Mortality rate, infant (per 1,000 live births)  99.61  94.19  74.51  64.78  97.90  90.40 
Mortality rate, under-5 (per 1,000)  167.32  157.49  108.28  94.48  166.93  153.58 
Goal 5: Improve maternal health                   
Births attended by skilled health staff (% of 
total)  .  45.13  40.99  44.31  41.36  39.32 
Goal 6: Combat HIV/AIDS, malaria and 
other diseases                   
Prevalence of HIV, total (% of population ages 
15-49)  .  5.76  8.62  1.80  8.62  4.76 
Goal 7: Ensure environmental sustainability                   
Improved sanitation facilities (% of population 
with access)  35.16  37.05  34.25  38.59  33.57  35.59 
Improved water source (% of population with 
access)  54.48  56.12  72.95  75.89  52.20  54.28 
Goal 8: Develop a global partnership for 
development                   
Aid per capita (current US$)  20.00  52.00  10.04  20.35  18.78  52.30 
Other                   
Fertility rate, total (births per woman)  6  5  3.94  3.45  5.83  5.37 
GNI per capita, Atlas method (current US$)  483  829  409.29  714.36  289.51  525.56 
Life expectancy at birth, total (years)  49  50  59.44  61.07  49.18  50.52 
Population, total (1000)  673,000  782,000             
Source: World Development Indicators (2008); own calculations. 
The rather sobering overall result is that most fragility definitions do not seem to track MDG progress 
very well. For example, Table 3 shows the development of the primary education completion rate, 
under-five mortality and GDP per capita for the three Sub-Saharan Africa countries for the years 
1995, 2000 and 2006: Burkina Faso, Ethiopia, and Zimbabwe. Burkina Faso was not on any fragility 
list between 2003 and 2007, while Ethiopia appears on the DFID list, and Zimbabwe belongs to the 
“core” fragile list, i.e., it shows a very persistent fragility status. However, the table reveals a very 
heterogeneous picture of progress towards the MDGs, which is not necessarily related to the fragility 
status of the country, but is a common characteristic of Sub-Saharan Africa, instead. Fragility and MDG Progress: How Useful is the Fragility Concept? 
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In terms of human development, Burkina Faso is among the worst-off countries, with a HDI of 
only 0.36 in 2006, which corresponds to a rank position of 174. In contrast, Zimbabwe shows a HDI 
of 0.49 (in 2004) corresponding to the rank position of 151. Ethiopia shows a HDI of 0.38 in 2006, 
close to Burkina Faso (rank 171). From these countries, Burkina Faso, not on any fragility list, shows 
by far the lowest primary education completion rate and the highest under-five mortality level in 
2006, and also relatively slow progress towards these goals. Ethiopia, which was involved in conflicts 
with neighbouring states, and experienced intra-state armed conflicts between ethnic groups often as a 
result of persisting droughts in the region since the 1960s, shows the lowest GDP per capita level in 
2006, but also shows considerable progress towards the goals of primary education completion and 
under-five mortality. Zimbabwe, which is among the countries that appears on all fragility lists, and 
shows a very persistent fragility status over time, shows the highest levels in MDGs among these 
three countries. However, primary education completion rates decreased between 2000 and 2006 and 
under-five mortality increased, which indicates the severe vulnerability within the country. 
Table 3: Development of selected MDGs in Burkina Faso, Ethiopia and Zimbabwe 
   Primary completion rate  Under-five mortality  GDP per capita (ppp) 
   1995  2000  2006  1995  2000  2006  1995  2000  2006 
Burkina  Faso 20.04  25.03  31.29  193.5 193.9 204.25 768  920  1095 
Ethiopia  17.93  21.58  48.61  178.5  150.6  122.8  466  506  617 
Zimbabwe 90.05  90.44  81.03 98.7  105  105  1001  1018  1220 
Source: World Development Indicators (2008); own calculations. 
To obtain a better impression of the country-specific heterogeneity of the progress towards the MDGs 
with regard to the fragility status, Figure 4 examines MDG progress by countries, and lists the 
number of times a country has been defined as fragile in Box 2 (ranging from 1 to 7 times). The 
heterogeneity of MDG performance within this group of fragile countries is bewildering. Some 
countries seem to have done rather well in terms of growth, poverty reduction and MDG progress, 
while others perform poorly in most of them. It is not easy to detect clear patterns, and progress in 
one MDG seems to be only weakly correlated to progress in others, a finding already discussed at 
length in Bourguignon et al., (2008).
4 It appears that some African fragile countries, such as Côte 
d’Ivoire and Central African Republic, do rather well on most MDGs, while Zimbabwe is one of the 
few countries reliably faring worse than many others. 
 
                                                      
4   See, also, Ndulu et al., (2007) who tried to come up with country categorisations of the growth experience in Africa and 
found that within-group heterogeneity was often larger than between groups. Kenneth Harttgen and Stephan Klasen 
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Figure 4: Fragile States – Change in MDG indicators by country and definition (2000-2006) 
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Note: Country abbreviations: Afghanistan (AFG), Angola (AGO), Azerbaijan (AZE), Bangladesh (BGD), Burundi (BDI), Cambodia (KHM), Cameroon (CMR) Central African 
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The little correlation between the fragility classification and the progress in the MDGs raises the 
question of the appropriateness of the MDGs to capture the heterogeneity of fragile states. In addition, 
it might also be the case that the MDGs fail to take into account some important common basic 
features of fragile states, which are important for an appropriate classification. For example, the 
MDGs do not take into account any characteristics that provide information on political variables 
such as democracy, political stability, or rule of law. Low effectiveness of state institutions and a 
weak government are strongly associated with fragile states, and are, therefore, more likely to be a 
good indicator for fragile states. To investigate this question, Figure 5 shows the correlation of three 
political variables, two Freedom House indicators, the political rights score, and the civil liberty 
score,
1 and the corruption perception index (CPI) provided by Transparency International for 
countries in Sub-Saharan Africa by their status of fragility (measured by the 2007 CPIA index), and 
their level of GDP per capita.
2 
Figure 5 shows a very mixed result with regard to the relationship of the fragility status and 
political indicators with GDP per capita. Looking at the Freedom House indicators, both for the 
political rights scores as well as for the civil liberty scores, provides a fairly weak relationship 
between state fragility and the respective scores with regard to GDP per capita. There seems only to 
be a slightly upward trend between fragile sates and non-fragile states. The relationship is clearer 
when one looks at the corruption index. Here, a somewhat clear negative relationship between 
fragility and corruption is observable, i.e., fragile states are affected by higher levels of corruption 
than non-fragile states in Sub-Saharan Africa. However, although a slight relationship is observable, 
the heterogeneity among countries remains generally high, so that it is not clear whether the fragility 
concept clearly captures the political dimensions when controlling for GDP per capita. On the other 
hand, the relationship seems to be more present when directly comparing the means of the political 
indictors of fragile and non-fragile states, which are shown in Table 4. Here, fragile states show a 
significantly poorer performance than non-fragile states. 
                                                      
1   http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=213&year=2002. 
2   http://www.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/cpi. Kenneth Harttgen and Stephan Klasen 
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Note: The CPI ranks 180 countries by their perceived levels of corruption, as determined by expert 
assessments and opinion surveys. It takes values between 0 and 10, while 0 indicates the highest level of 
corruption and 10 the lowest level of corruption. The political rights and civil liberties categories contain 
numerical ratings between 1 and 7, with 1 representing the most free and 7 the least free. 
Source: World Development Indicators (2008); own calculations. 
Table 4: Means of Political Indicators of Fragile versus Non-Fragile States 
   Fragile States  Non-Fragile States  T Test of differences 
Political Right Score   3.88  5.50  1.62** 
Civil Liberty Score  3.65  5.21  1.57** 
Corruption Perception Index  2.88  1.97  0.91** 
Note: ** denotes a one percent significant level. 
Source: World Development Indicators (2008); own calculations. 
7. Possible explanations of the heterogeneity of fragile countries in MDG progress 
The previous section has shown that fragile states are not inherently worse off in reaching the MDGs, 
compared to other developing countries, especially in the Sub-Saharan Africa region, which makes it 
unclear as to whether grouping countries into “fragile” versus “non-fragile” is useful when tracking 
progress towards the MDGs, because it does seem to capture the heterogeneity of countries 
appropriately. 
This section briefly provides some possible explanations for this heterogeneity, and discusses 
some possible factors that drive the somewhat surprising results. Fragility and MDG Progress: How Useful is the Fragility Concept? 
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First, there are many possible reasons for this lack of a bivariate correlation. One of the most 
important ones may be that there are confounding factors that weaken this relationship. To examine 
this, one ought to estimate a proper empirical model of factors affecting MDG progress, which would 
include different variables for different MDG indicators. In the spirit of the World Bank (2007a, b) 
papers that assessed the predictive power of the CPIA for the human development performance of 
countries, Box 4 provides a simple regression model to analyse the impact of the CPIA score on 
MDG outcomes. However, the results of this simple empirical analysis reveal no clear relationship 
between the fragility status (measured by the CPIA) and the MDG outcomes, which confirms the 
results of the foregoing section. The CPIA only appears to be able to affect income growth and 
poverty reduction significantly, but none of the non-income MDGs. 
Box 4: The effect of the CPIA on MDG outcomes 
1-  To examine the effect of the CPIA on MDG changes in MDG outcomes, a very 
parsimonious regression model of the following form is estimated: 
2-  ΔMDG= a + b MDG(initial) + c CPIA + dSSA + eHIV+ fCPIA*SSA+g,  
3-  in which MDG(initial) refers to the initial level of the MDG indicator, CPIA refers 
to the CPIA score, SSA refers to a Sub-Saharan Africa Dummy, ADIS to the HIV infection 
rate and CPIA*SSA to an interaction term of the CPIA score and the Sub-Saharan Africa 
dummy 
4-  The model is estimated for the two time-periods 1990-2006 and 2000-2006, 
both for absolute, as well as for relative, changes in GDP per capita, poverty headcount, 
underweight of children under five, and the under-five mortality rate. 
5-  Results: 
Dependent 
Variable 


















MDG (initial level)  -0.001  0.002  -0.019*  0.003 
CPIA score  0.485**  1.376*  0.156  1.451 
Sub-Saharan Africa  -1.551**  8.865**  4.074*  8.115* 
HIV infection rate  -0,003  0.059  -.038  -0.048* 
CPIA score*SSA  -0.491**  -2.640**  -1.128  -2.274* 
Constant -1.321**  -6.064**  -0.652**  -7.551* 
R-squared  0.274 0.283 0,328  0.094 
N  53 44 17  54 
6- Source: WDI (2008); Harttgen and Klasen (2009). 
7-  Exemplarily, the results are presented for the time-period 2000-2006 for 
relative changes in the MDG indicator. All co-efficients show the expected signs. The results 
sometimes show “conditional convergence” and usually a negative co-efficient for SSA and 
AIDS-affected countries. The results show the occasional significant effects of the CPIA 
score. Only for the income related development indicators is the overall CPIA effect 
significant, while, here, the interaction term of the CPIA score and the Sub-Saharan Africa 
dummy is also significant and large in magnitude. For non-income indicators, the CPIA score 
shows no significant impact. These results also hold for the time-period 1990-2006 and also 
for using absolute changes in the MDGs indicators. These mixed results underline the 
hypotheses of the limitations of the existing classification of fragile states for tracking 
progress in the MDGs. 
Second, another possible explanation is the problem of measurement errors and data availability when 
tracking the progress of the MDGs. One major limitation in analysing the levels and progress in the 
MDGs remains the availability of data and cross-country comparison shortcomings. For example, 
newly available income poverty estimates have changed the levels of poverty in many countries (ICP 
2005, World Bank 2007c). In addition, the indicator of hunger is sometimes difficult to interpret 
(Klasen, 2007). Besides problems of definition of the MDG poverty indicators, only limited 
standardised data are available for both the developing region as well as for the developed countries, Kenneth Harttgen and Stephan Klasen 
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such as the Living Standard Measurement Surveys (LSMS) provided by the World Bank, the 
Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS) provided by USAID, or the Multiple Indicator Cluster 
Survey (MICS) provided by UNICEF. And even these standard surveys do not provide annual 
information. For fragile states, in particular, it is hard to obtain precise estimates on, for example, 
child mortality rates, and access to water and sanitation, since many of the fragile states do not 
participate in these survey programmes. And even if data are available, cross-country comparability 
problems remain a concern. One main reason for this is that information on the MDGs often becomes 
available only with a considerable time-lag, which makes a cross country comparison at a given year 
very difficult. 
Third, there is the issue of absolute versus relative changes in the MDGs. This is particularly 
relevant for MDG1 (reduction of poverty and underweight children) and MDG4 (the reduction of 
under-five mortality). Since, fragile countries are performing worse in terms of MDG levels, the same 
absolute level of MDG progress will be smaller in relative (i.e., percentage) terms. Reducing under-
five mortality from 180 to 162 is “only” a 10% reduction, while reducing it from 80 to 62 is a 22.5% 
reduction. As shown in the appendix, it is, indeed, the case that, using a larger set of definitions, the 
relative progress of these MDG indicators is slower in fragile states. But three points are worth 
noting. First, even when considering relative change, the differences in MDG progress between 
fragile and non-fragile states are very clear, while it remains the case that the clearest distinction is 
between the “core” fragile and the remaining countries. Second, relative progress in education (goal 
2) looks even more impressive in fragile countries, as they are starting from a lower base. Third, there 
is the real question of whether absolute or relative changes are the right concept. This goes to the 
heart of Easterly’s critique of the MDGs as being “unfair” to Africa (Easterly, 2009). He argues that 
demanding a halving of poverty and of underweight children, and a reduction of under-five mortality 
by two-thirds is much harder to do when one starts with very high levels of deprivation in these areas; 
to the extent that one agrees with this line of argument, using absolute changes might be more 
relevant.
3 
A fourth reason might be that the state of being fragile is not as damaging to MDG progress as the 
risk of falling into the state of fragility, i.e., becoming fragile is worse than being fragile. This is 
possible, though not easy to verify, since the time series information on fragility is rather limited at 
present. In the extreme, it is certainly the case that a country in which a large-scale violent conflict 
erupts will face great difficulties in sustaining MDG progress. On the other hand, the fact that those 
countries that are fragile in all dimensions of the CPIA do worst in terms of MDG progress suggests 
that the cumulative state of remaining fragile is, indeed, a more serious problem than that of slipping 
or sliding into fragility. 
Closely related to this is a fifth reason. Most of the MDG indicators display a great deal of inertia. 
Even if economic and governance conditions deteriorate, it may take a while before life expectancy or 
enrolment figures budge significantly as households will still want to invest in health and education, 
and public delivery systems often continue to function even in an environment in which the economic 
conditions and governance are deteriorating. Thus, it is unlikely that a country that has slipped below 
3.2 in the CPIA for one or two years will quickly or immediately display a deteriorating MDG 
performance. To the extent that this is the case, one would either expect these negative effects to 
appear with a longer lag and thus be harder to capture. Also, this could explain the relevance of the 
core fragile concept for MDG progress. 
A sixth reason for the surprisingly good MDG progress in many fragile states could be related to 
donor initiatives. Donors have been very active and supportive in many fragile states, especially in 
post-conflict countries, and the resources which they poured into these countries might have played a 
role in accelerating MDG progress. Particularly in post-conflict countries, there can be high pay-offs 
                                                      
3   See, also, Klasen and Misselhorn (2007) for a related discussion. Fragility and MDG Progress: How Useful is the Fragility Concept? 
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from just getting the education and health systems to function again. But this is a hypothesis which, at 
the present moment, would require much more detailed analysis. 
Lastly, it may, indeed, be the heterogeneity of the country conditions in fragile states that drives 
the heterogeneous performance regarding MDG progress. Among the heterogeneities to consider are 
the different causes that determined why the countries ended up in the fragile category, the 
heterogeneous capacities of states (and donors) to pursue an MDG focused policy agenda, and the 
presence or absence of natural resources, to name some of the most important heterogeneities. 
Although all of the reasons cited above are likely to play a role in accounting for the low 
correlation of the fragile/non-fragile distinction with MDG progress, and the large heterogeneity 
within that group, it seems likely that this last reason is the most important one, as it can, in particular, 
explain the very large heterogeneity in the MDG progress among fragile states. To the extent that this 
is the case, it appears that the fragile category is not as useful as it has been made out to be, when 
trying to focus on priority countries in order to accelerate MDG progress. Instead, one should either 
look for a smaller sub-set of this group of fragile countries (the ones that do poorly in all four 
dimensions of the CPIA) or develop other more homogeneous sub-groups (for example, post-conflict 
countries, failed states, poor governance countries, etc.,) of fragile states. Whether this will end up as 
being more illuminating is, however, unclear. Maybe, each of these fragile countries is a case unto 
itself, which does not lend itself to easy categorisation. 
8. Conclusion and Policy Issues 
This paper has shown that the recent creation of the “fragile” states concept has generally created 
more confusion than clarity. There is a plethora of definitions, with many lists that change in 
definition and over time. While it is clear that this group of countries, regardless of the definition 
used, is doing worse in terms of MDG achievements, there is no clear correlation with MDG 
progress, and the heterogeneity of the performance among fragile states is vast. Two ways out of this 
dilemma are possible. The first is to look for more robust categorisations of fragile states, such as one 
in which a country is deemed fragile if it has been on a list for several years or in several categories 
(for example, the four categories of the CPIA). The second is to move towards treating each of these 
countries sui generis, requiring a different analytical and policy approach. 
This tremendous heterogeneity of performance in fragile states poses a great challenge to policy-
making not only in the countries but also in the international community. Given the tremendous 
heterogeneity of this group, a very flexible approach to policy-making that is able to respond to the 
specific country-specific challenges is more urgent here than elsewhere. Moreover, this policy 
approach has to respond quickly to rapidly-evolving situations, as the political, security, economic, 
and governance situations in these states will change more quickly than in other countries. Often, 
quick short-term action is required to address longer-term challenges. Such short-term action can be 
required to safeguard MDG achievements and to invest in order to initiate and to sustain progress, 
both of which will be visible only years later. 
This poses a major challenge not only to the policies to be considered, but also to the policy-
making processes of national governments as well as of donors. In fragile states, timely country-
specific analytical work is needed to develop and adapt policies rapidly to an evolving situation. The 
rather slow-moving processes of policy-making (via national planning agencies, multi-year budgeting 
or PRSP processes) or multi-year donor programming are usually unable to respond with the speed 
and specificity required. Instead, there is a need for rapid analytical work followed by quick policy 
formulation and implementation. While these types of approach are well-known in security 
discourses, the challenge of heterogeneous forms of fragility will require similar approaches to 
respond effectively in these situations, in order to sustain MDG achievements and progress. Kenneth Harttgen and Stephan Klasen 
30 
References 
Bourguignon, F., A. Benassy-Quere, S. Dercon, A. Estache, J.W. Gunning, R. Kanbur, S. Klasen, S. 
Maxwell, J.P. Platteau, and A. Spadaro (2008), Millennium Development Goals at Midpoint: 
Where do we stand and where do we need to go? Paper written for the DG Development of the 
European Commission as a background paper for the 2009 European Report on Development. 
Chauvet, L. and P. Collier (2004), Development Effectiveness in Fragile States: Spillovers and 
Turnarounds, Centre for the Study of African Economies, Oxford University.  
Collier, P. (2007), The Bottom Billion: Why the Poorest Countries are Failing and What Can be Done 
About It, Oxford: Oxford University Press.  
Collier, P. (2000), The Political Economy of Fragile States and Implications for European 
Development Policy, Department of Economics, Oxford University. 
Dollar, D. and V. Levin (2005), The Forgotten States: Aid Volumes and Volatility in Difficult 
Partnerships, Summary paper prepared for the DAC Learning and Advisory Process on Difficult 
Partnerships, Washington, World Bank. 
Easterly W. (2009), How the Millennium Development Goals are Unfair to Africa, World 
Development, 37 (1): 26-35. 
ICP (2005), Global Purchasing Power Parities and Real Expenditures, Washington, World Bank. 
Klasen, S. (2007), Gender-related indicators of well-being. In McGillivray, M. (ed.) Human Well-
Being: Concepts and Measurement. London: Palgrave. 
Klasen, S. (2008), Economic Growth and Poverty Reduction: Measurement issues in income and non-
income dimensions, World Development, 36 (3): 420-445. 
Klsen, S. and M. Misselhorn (2007), Determinants of the Growth Semi-Elasticity of Poverty 
Reduction. Mimeographed, University of Göttingen. 
McGillivray, M. and S. Feeny (2007), Aid Allocation to Fragile States: Absorptive Capacity and 
Volatility, Helsinki: United Nations University, World Institute for Development Economic 
Research. 
ODI (2006), Annual Report 2006: What’s next in international development?, Oversears 
Development Institute, London. 
OECD (2009), Ensuring Fragile States are not Left Behind – Summary Report March 2009, OECD, 
Paris. 
OECD (2008), Resource Flows to Fragile and Conflict-Affected Countries, OECD, Paris. 
Stewart, F. and G. Brown (2009), Fragile States, CRISE Working Paper No. 51, CRISE, Oxford 
University. 
United Nations (2008), The Millennium Development Goals Report 2008, New York: United Nations. 
United Nations (2005), The Millennium Development Goals Report 2005, New York: United Nations. 
World Bank (2006), Annual Review of Development Effectiveness 2006 - Getting Results, 
Washington DC: The World Bank. 
World Bank (2007), Global Monitoring Report, Washington DC: The World Bank. 
World Bank (2007a), Selectivity and performance: IDA’s Country Assessment and Development 
Effectiveness, International Development Association (IDA), World Bank. Fragility and MDG Progress: How Useful is the Fragility Concept? 
31 
World Bank (2007b), Additions to IDA Resources: Fifteenth Replenishment IDA: The Platform for 
Achieving Results at the Country Level, International Development Association (IDA), World 
Bank. 
World Bank (2007c), World Development Indicators 2007, Washington DC: The World Bank. 
World Bank (2008), Global Monitoring Report, Washington DC: The World Bank. 
Word Bank (2009), Global Monitoring Report 2009, Washington DC, World Bank. 
 Kenneth Harttgen and Stephan Klasen 
32 
Appendix 
Table A1: 2007 IDA Resource Allocation Index (IRAI) 
  
A. Economic 
Management  B. Structural Policies  C. Policies for Social Inclusion/Equity  D. Public Sector Management and Institutions    
   1  2  3     4  5  6     7  8  9  10  11     12  13  14  15  16       

























































AFGHANISTAN  3.5  3.0 3.0 3.2  2.5 2.0 2.5  2.3  2.0  2.5  3.0  2.0  2.0  2.3  1.5  3.0  2.5  2.0  2.0  2.2  2.5 
ANGOLA    3.0  3.0 3.0 3.0  4.0 2.5 2.0  2.8  3.0  2.5  2.5  2.5  3.0  2.7  2.0  2.5  2.5  2.5  2.5  2.4  2.7 
ARMENIA    5.5  5.0 6.0 5.5  4.5 3.5 4.0  4.0  4.5  4.5  4.0  4.5  3.5  4.2  3.5  4.0  3.5  4.0  3.5  3.7  4.4 
AZERBAIJAN   4.5  4.5 5.0 4.7  4.0 3.0 3.5  3.5  4.0  4.0  3.5  4.0  3.0  3.7  3.0  4.0  3.5  3.0  2.5  3.2  3.8 
BANGLADESH    4.0  3.5 4.5 4.0  3.5 3.0 3.5  3.3  4.0  3.5  4.0  3.5  3.0  3.6  3.0  3.0  3.0  3.0  3.0  3.0  3.5 
BENIN    4.5  4.0 3.5 4.0  4.0 3.5 3.5  3.7  3.5  3.0  3.5  3.0  3.5  3.3  3.0  3.5  3.5  3.0  3.5  3.3  3.6 
BHUTAN    4.5  4.5 4.5 4.5  3.0 3.0 3.5  3.2  4.0  4.0  4.5  3.5  4.5  4.1  3.5  3.5  4.0  4.0  4.0  3.8  3.9 
BOLIVIA    4.0  4.0 4.5 4.2  5.0 3.5 2.5  3.7  4.0  4.0  4.0  3.5  3.5  3.8  2.5  3.5  4.0  3.0  3.5  3.3  3.7 
BOSNIA & 
HERZ.  4.5  3.5 4.0 4.0  3.5 4.0 4.0  3.8  4.5  3.0  3.5  3.5  3.5  3.6  3.0  3.5  4.0  3.0  3.0  3.3  3.7 
BURKINA  FASO  4.5  4.5 4.0 4.3  4.0 3.0 3.0  3.3  3.5  4.0  3.5  3.5  3.5  3.6  3.5  4.0  3.5  3.5  3.0  3.5  3.7 
BURUNDI    3.5  3.5 2.5 3.2  3.5 3.0 2.5  3.0  4.0  3.5  3.0  3.0  3.0  3.3  2.5  3.0  3.0  2.5  2.0  2.6  3.0 
CAMBODIA    4.5  3.0 3.5 3.7  3.5 2.5 3.5  3.2  4.0  3.0  3.5  3.0  3.0  3.3  2.5  3.0  3.0  2.5  2.5  2.7  3.2 
CAMEROON    4.0  4.0 3.0 3.7  3.5 3.0 3.0  3.2  3.0  3.0  3.5  3.0  3.0  3.1  2.5  3.5  3.5  3.0  2.5  3.0  3.2 
CAPE VERDE   4.5  4.5  4.5  4.5  4.0  4.0  3.5  3.8  4.5  4.5  4.5  4.5  3.5  4.3  4.0  4.0  3.5  4.0  4.5  4.0  4.2 
CENTRAL AFR. 
REP.  3.5  3.0 2.0 2.8  3.5 2.5 2.0  2.7  2.5  2.0  2.0  2.0  2.5  2.2  2.0  2.0  2.5  2.5  2.5  2.3  2.5 
CHAD    3.0  2.5 2.5 2.7  3.0 3.0 2.5  2.8  2.5  3.0  2.5  2.5  2.5  2.6  2.0  2.0  2.5  2.5  2.0  2.2  2.6 
COMOROS    2.5  1.5 2.0 2.0  3.0 2.5 2.5  2.7  3.0  3.0  3.0  2.5  2.0  2.7  2.5  1.5  2.5  2.0  2.5  2.2  2.4 
CONGO, DEM. 
REP.  3.5  3.5 2.5 3.2  4.0 2.0 3.0  3.0  3.0  3.0  3.0  3.0  2.5  2.9  2.0  2.5  2.5  2.5  2.0  2.3  2.8 
CONGO,  REP 3.0  2.0 2.5 2.5  3.5 2.5 2.5  2.8  3.0  2.5  3.0  2.5  2.5  2.7  2.5  2.5  3.0  2.5  2.5  2.6  2.7 
CôTE  D'IVOIRE  3.0  2.5 1.5 2.3  3.5 3.0 3.0  3.2  2.5  1.5  2.5  2.5  2.5  2.3  2.0  2.0  4.0  2.0  2.0  2.4  2.6 
DJIBOUTI  3.5  2.5 2.5 2.8  4.0 3.5 3.5  3.7  2.5  3.0  3.5  3.0  3.0  3.0  2.5  3.0  3.5  2.5  2.5  2.8  3.1 
DOMINICA    4.0  4.5 3.0 3.8  4.0 4.0 4.5  4.2  3.5  3.5  4.0  3.5  3.5  3.6  4.0  3.5  4.0  3.5  4.0  3.8  3.9 
ERITREA    2.0  2.0 2.5 2.2  1.5 2.0 2.0  1.8  3.5  3.0  3.5  3.0  2.0  3.0  2.5  2.5  3.5  3.0  2.0  2.7  2.4 
ETHIOPIA    3.0  4.0 3.5 3.5  3.0 3.0 3.5  3.2  3.0  4.5  4.0  3.5  3.5  3.7  3.0  4.0  4.0  3.0  2.5  3.3  3.4 
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GEORGIA    4.5  4.5 5.0 4.7  5.5 3.5 5.0  4.7  4.5  4.5  4.0  4.0  3.0  4.0  3.5  4.0  4.5  3.5  3.0  3.7  4.3 
GHANA    4.0  4.0 4.0 4.0  4.0 4.0 4.0  4.0  4.0  4.0  4.5  3.5  3.5  3.9  3.5  4.0  4.5  3.5  4.0  3.9  4.0 
GRENADA    3.5  2.5 3.0 3.0  4.0 3.5 4.5  4.0  5.0  3.5  4.0  3.5  4.0  4.0  3.5  4.0  3.5  3.5  4.0  3.7  3.7 
GUINEA    3.0  3.5 2.5 3.0  4.0 3.0 3.0  3.3  3.5  3.0  3.0  3.0  2.5  3.0  2.0  3.0  3.0  3.0  2.5  2.7  3.0 
GUINEA-BISSAU  2.0  2.5 1.5 2.0  4.0 3.0 2.5  3.2  2.5  3.0  2.5  2.5  2.5  2.6  2.5  2.5  3.0  2.5  2.5  2.6  2.6 
GUYANA    3.5  3.5 4.0 3.7  4.0 3.5 3.0  3.5  4.0  3.5  3.5  3.0  3.0  3.4  3.0  3.5  3.5  2.5  3.0  3.1  3.4 
HAITI    3.5  3.5 2.5 3.2  4.0 3.0 2.5  3.2  3.0  3.0  2.5  2.5  2.5  2.7  2.0  3.0  2.5  2.5  2.0  2.4  2.9 
HONDURAS    4.0  3.5 4.0 3.8  5.0 3.5 4.5  4.3  4.0  4.0  4.0  3.5  3.0  3.7  3.5  4.0  4.0  3.0  3.0  3.5  3.8 
INDIA  4.5  3.5 4.5 4.2  4.0 4.0 3.5  3.8  3.5  4.0  4.0  3.5  3.5  3.7  3.5  4.0  4.0  3.5  3.5  3.7  3.9 
KENYA    4.5  4.0 4.0 4.2  4.0 3.5 4.0  3.8  3.0  3.0  3.5  3.0  3.5  3.2  2.5  3.5  4.0  3.5  3.0  3.3  3.6 
KIRIBATI    2.5  2.0 5.0 3.2  3.0 3.0 3.0  3.0  3.0  3.0  2.5  3.0  3.0  2.9  3.5  3.0  3.0  3.0  3.5  3.2  3.1 
KYRGYZ  REP. 4.5  4.0 4.0 4.2  5.0 3.5 3.5  4.0  4.5  3.5  3.5  3.5  3.0  3.6  2.5  3.0  3.5  3.0  2.5  2.9  3.7 
LAO  PDR  4.5  3.5 3.5 3.8  3.5 2.0 3.0  2.8  3.5  3.5  3.0  2.5  3.5  3.2  3.0  3.0  2.5  3.0  2.0  2.7  3.1 
LESOTHO    4.0  4.0 4.0 4.0  3.5 3.5 3.0  3.3  4.0  3.0  3.5  3.0  3.5  3.4  3.5  3.0  4.0  3.0  3.5  3.4  3.5 
MADAGASCAR    4.0  3.0 4.0 3.7  4.0 3.5 4.0  3.8  3.5  4.0  3.5  3.5  4.0  3.7  3.5  3.5  3.5  3.5  3.5  3.5  3.7 
MALAWI  3.5  3.5 3.0 3.3  4.0 3.0 3.5  3.5  3.5  3.5  3.0  3.5  3.5  3.4  3.5  3.0  4.0  3.5  3.0  3.4  3.4 
MALDIVES    3.0  2.5 3.0 2.8  4.0 4.0 4.0  4.0  4.0  4.0  4.0  3.5  4.0  3.9  4.0  3.0  4.0  4.0  2.5  3.5  3.6 
MALI  4.5  4.0 4.5 4.3  4.0 3.0 3.5  3.5  3.5  3.5  3.5  3.5  3.5  3.5  3.5  3.5  4.0  3.0  3.5  3.5  3.7 
MAURITANIA    3.5  3.0 4.0 3.5  4.5 2.5 3.5  3.5  4.0  3.5  3.5  3.0  3.5  3.5  3.0  2.5  3.5  3.0  3.0  3.0  3.4 
MOLDOVA  4.0  4.0 4.0 4.0  4.5 3.5 3.5  3.8  5.0  3.5  4.0  3.5  3.5  3.9  3.5  4.0  3.5  3.0  3.0  3.4  3.8 
MONGOLIA    3.5  3.0 3.0 3.2  4.5 3.0 3.5  3.7  3.5  3.5  3.5  3.5  3.0  3.4  3.0  4.0  3.5  3.5  3.0  3.4  3.4 
MOZAMBIQUE    4.0  4.0 4.5 4.2  4.5 3.5 3.0  3.7  3.5  3.5  3.5  3.0  3.0  3.3  3.0  3.5  4.0  3.0  3.0  3.3  3.6 
NEPAL    4.5  3.5 3.5 3.8  4.0 3.0 3.0  3.3  3.5  3.5  4.0  3.0  3.0  3.4  3.0  3.5  3.5  3.0  3.0  3.2  3.4 
NICARAGUA   4.0  4.0 4.5 4.2  4.5 3.5 3.5  3.8  3.5  4.0  3.5  3.5  3.5  3.6  3.0  4.0  4.0  3.0  3.0  3.4  3.8 
NIGER    4.0  3.5 3.5 3.7  4.0 3.0 3.0  3.3  2.5  3.5  3.0  3.0  3.0  3.0  3.0  3.5  3.5  3.0  3.0  3.2  3.3 
NIGERIA    4.0  4.5 4.5 4.3  3.0 3.5 3.0  3.2  3.0  3.5  3.0  3.5  3.0  3.2  2.5  3.0  3.0  3.0  3.0  2.9  3.4 
PAKISTAN   3.5  3.5  4.5  3.8  4.0  4.5  4.0 4.2  2.0  3.5 3.5 3.0 3.5 3.1  3.0  3.5 3.5 3.5  2.5  3.2  3.6 
PAPUA NEW 
GUINEA  4.5  3.5 4.5 4.2  4.5 3.0 3.0  3.5  2.5  3.5  2.5  3.0  2.0  2.7  2.0  3.5  3.5  2.5  3.0  2.9  3.3 
RWANDA    4.0  4.0 3.5 3.8  3.5 3.5 3.5  3.5  3.5  4.5  4.5  3.5  3.0  3.8  3.0  4.0  3.5  3.5  3.5  3.5  3.7 
SAMOA  4.0  3.5 4.0 3.8  4.5 4.0 3.5  4.0  3.5  4.0  4.0  3.5  4.0  3.8  4.0  3.5  4.0  4.0  4.0  3.9  3.9 
SÃO TOMÉ AND 
PRINCIPE  3.0  3.0 2.5 2.8  4.0 2.5 3.0  3.2  3.0  3.0  3.0  2.5  2.5  2.8  2.5  3.0  3.5  3.0  3.5  3.1  3.0 
SENEGAL    4.5  4.0 4.0 4.2  4.0 3.5 4.0  3.8  3.5  3.5  3.5  3.0  3.5  3.4  3.5  3.5  4.0  3.5  3.0  3.5  3.7 
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ISLANDS  3.5  3.0 2.5 3.0  3.0 3.0 2.5  2.8  3.0  2.5  3.0  2.5  2.0  2.6  2.5  2.5  2.5  2.0  3.0  2.5  2.7 
SRI  LANKA  2.5  3.0 3.5 3.0  3.5 4.0 4.0  3.8  4.0  3.5  4.0  3.5  3.5  3.7  3.0  4.0  3.5  3.0  3.0  3.3  3.5 
ST. LUCIA   4.5  3.5  4.0  4.0  4.0  4.0  4.5  4.2  3.5  4.0  4.0  4.0  3.5  3.8  4.0  3.5  4.0  3.5  4.5  3.9  4.0 
ST. VINCENT & 
THE G.  4.0  3.5 3.5 3.7  4.0 4.0 4.5  4.2  4.0  3.5  4.0  3.5  3.5  3.7  4.0  3.5  4.0  3.5  4.0  3.8  3.8 
SUDAN    3.5  3.0 1.5 2.7  2.5 2.5 3.0  2.7  2.0  2.5  2.5  2.5  2.5  2.4  2.0  2.0  3.0  2.5  2.0  2.3  2.5 
TAJIKISTAN   4.0  4.0 3.0 3.7  4.0 3.0 3.5  3.5  3.5  3.5  3.0  3.5  2.5  3.2  2.5  3.0  3.0  2.5  2.0  2.6  3.2 
TANZANIA  4.5  4.5 4.0 4.3  4.0 3.5 3.5  3.7  4.0  4.0  4.0  3.5  3.5  3.8  3.5  4.0  4.0  3.5  3.5  3.7  3.9 
TIMOR-LESTE  2.5  3.0 3.5 3.0  3.5 2.5 1.5  2.5  3.5  3.0  2.5  2.0  2.5  2.7  1.5  3.0  3.0  2.5  3.0  2.6  2.7 
TOGO    2.5  2.5 1.5 2.2  4.0 2.5 3.0  3.2  3.0  2.0  3.0  2.5  2.5  2.6  2.5  2.0  2.5  2.0  2.0  2.2  2.5 
TONGA    3.0  2.5 3.0 2.8  3.5 3.0 3.0  3.2  2.5  3.5  4.0  3.0  3.0  3.2  3.5  2.5  3.0  3.0  2.5  2.9  3.0 
UGANDA    4.5  4.5 4.5 4.5  4.0 3.5 4.0  3.8  3.5  4.5  4.0  3.5  4.0  3.9  3.5  4.0  3.0  3.0  3.0  3.3  3.9 
UZBEKISTAN    3.5  3.5 4.0 3.7  2.5 2.5 3.0  2.7  4.0  3.5  4.0  3.5  3.5  3.7  2.5  3.0  3.0  2.5  1.5  2.5  3.1 
VANUATU    4.0  3.0 4.0 3.7  3.5 3.0 3.5  3.3  3.5  3.5  2.5  2.0  3.0  2.9  3.0  3.5  3.5  2.5  3.0  3.1  3.3 
VIETNAM  4.5  4.5 4.0 4.3  3.5 3.0 3.5  3.3  4.5  4.5  4.0  3.5  3.5  4.0  3.5  4.0  3.5  3.5  3.0  3.5  3.8 
YEMEN,  REP. 3.5  3.0 4.0 3.5  4.5 2.5 3.5  3.5  2.0  3.5  3.0  3.5  3.0  3.0  2.5  3.0  3.0  3.0  3.0  2.9  3.2 
ZAMBIA    4.0  3.5 3.5 3.7  4.0 3.5 3.5  3.7  3.5  3.5  3.5  3.0  3.5  3.4  3.0  3.5  3.5  3.0  3.0  3.2  3.5 
ZIMBABWE    1.0  1.0 1.0 1.0  2.0 2.5 1.5  2.0  2.5  1.5  1.5  1.0  2.5  1.8  1.0  2.0  3.5  1.5  1.0  1.8  1.7 
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CPIA Non-CPIA CPIA-SSA CPIA-Core CPIA-All DFID SSA Non-SSA
  
Note: CPIA: fragile states included in the 2007 CPIA list (with a CPIA score of less than 3.2); non-CPIA: non-
fragile developing countries; CPIA-SSA: Sub-Saharan African countries included in the 2007 CPIA list; CPIA 
core: countries that appear on the CPIA list every year between 2003 and 2007; CPIA-All: countries that show 
a CPIA score of less than 3.2 on any of the CPIA sub-lists (economic management, structural policies, social 
inclusion/equity, public sector management) in 2007; DFID: countries included in the 2007 DFID list; SSA: all 
Sub-Saharan African countries; Non-SSA: Non-Sub-Saharan African developing countries. 
For the change in poverty headcount, Argentina and Ukraine are dropped from the sample, because they show 
very large absolute and relative differences, which distort the results of the mean outcomes for the non-CPIA 
countries. 
Source: World Development Indicators (2008); own calculations. Kenneth Harttgen and Stephan Klasen 
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CPIA Non-CPIA CPIA-SSA CPIA-Core CPIA-All DFID SSA Non-SSA
 
Note: CPIA: fragile states included in the 2007 CPIA list (with a CPIA score of less than 3.2); non-CPIA: non-
fragile developing countries; CPIA-SSA: Sub-Saharan African countries included in the 2007 CPIA list; CPIA 
core: countries that appear on the CPIA list every year between 2003 and 2007; CPIA-All: countries that show 
a CPIA score of less than 3.2 on any of the CPIA sub-lists (economic management, structural policies, social 
inclusion/equity, public sector management) in 2007; DFID: countries included in the 2007 DFID list; SSA: all 
Sub-Saharan African countries; Non-SSA: Non-Sub-Saharan African developing countries. 
For the change in poverty headcount, Argentina and Ukraine are dropped from the sample, because they show 
very large absolute and relative differences, which distort the results of the mean outcomes for the non-CPIA 
countries. 
Source: World Development Indicators (2008); own calculations. Fragility and MDG Progress: How Useful is the Fragility Concept? 
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CPIA Non-CPIA CPIA-SSA CPIA-Core CPIA-All DFID SSA Non-SSA
 
Note: CPIA: fragile states included in the 2007 CPIA list (with a CPIA score of less than 3.2); non-CPIA: non-
fragile developing countries; CPIA-SSA: Sub-Saharan African countries included in the 2007 CPIA list; CPIA 
core: countries that appear on the CPIA list every year between 2003 and 2007; CPIA-All: countries that show 
a CPIA score of less than 3.2 on any of the CPIA sub-lists (economic management, structural policies, social 
inclusion/equity, public sector management) in 2007; DFID: countries included in the 2007 DFID list; SSA: all 
Sub-Saharan African countries; Non-SSA: Non-Sub-Saharan African developing countries. 
For the change in poverty headcount, Argentina and Ukraine are dropped from the sample, because they show 
very large absolute and relative differences, which distort the results of the mean outcomes for the non-CPIA 
countries. 
Source: World Development Indicators (2008); own calculations. Kenneth Harttgen and Stephan Klasen 
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Figure A5: Fragile States – Change in MDG Indicators by country and definition (1990-2006) 
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Note: Country abbreviations: Afghanistan (AFG), Angola (AGO), Azerbaijan (AZE), Bangladesh (BGD), Burundi (BDI), Cambodia (KHM), Cameroon (CMR) Central African 
Republic (CAF), Chad (TCD), Congo, Dem. Rep. (ZAR), Congo, Rep. (COG), Côte d'Ivoire (CIV), Dominican Republic (DOM), Eritrea (ERI), Ethiopia (ETH), Georgia (GEO), 
Guinea (GIN), Haiti (HTI), Indonesia (IDN), Kenya (KEN), Kyrgyz Republic (KGZ), Laos PDR (LAO), Liberia (LBR), Mali (MLI), Mauritania (MRT), Myanmar (MMR), Nepal 
(NPL), Niger (NER), Nigeria (NGA), Pakistan (PAK), Papua New Guinea (PNG), Sierra Leone (SLE), Somalia (SOM), Sri Lanka (LKA), the Sudan (SDN), Tajikistan (TJK), Togo 
(TGO), Uzbekistan (UZB), Yemen, Rep. (YEM), Zimbabwe (ZWE). 
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Note: Country abbreviations: Afghanistan (AFG), Angola (AGO), Azerbaijan (AZE), Bangladesh (BGD), Burundi (BDI), Cambodia (KHM), Cameroon (CMR) Central African 
Republic (CAF), Chad (TCD), Congo, Dem. Rep. (ZAR), Congo, Rep. (COG), Côte d'Ivoire (CIV), Dominican Republic (DOM), Eritrea (ERI), Ethiopia (ETH), Georgia (GEO), 
Guinea (GIN), Haiti (HTI), Indonesia (IDN), Kenya (KEN), Kyrgyz Republic (KGZ), Laos PDR (LAO), Liberia (LBR), Mali (MLI), Mauritania (MRT), Myanmar (MMR), Nepal 
(NPL), Niger (NER), Nigeria (NGA), Pakistan (PAK), Papua New Guinea (PNG), Sierra Leone (SLE), Somalia (SOM), Sri Lanka (LKA), the Sudan (SDN), Tajikistan (TJK), Togo 
(TGO), Uzbekistan (UZB), Yemen, Rep. (YEM), Zimbabwe (ZWE). 
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Note: Country abbreviations: Afghanistan (AFG), Angola (AGO), Azerbaijan (AZE), Bangladesh (BGD), Burundi (BDI), Cambodia (KHM), Cameroon (CMR) Central African 
Republic (CAF), Chad (TCD), Congo, Dem. Rep. (ZAR), Congo, Rep. (COG), Côte d'Ivoire (CIV), Dominican Republic (DOM), Eritrea (ERI), Ethiopia (ETH), Georgia (GEO), 
Guinea (GIN), Haiti (HTI), Indonesia (IDN), Kenya (KEN), Kyrgyz Republic (KGZ), Laos PDR (LAO), Liberia (LBR), Mali (MLI), Mauritania (MRT), Myanmar (MMR), Nepal 
(NPL), Niger (NER), Nigeria (NGA), Pakistan (PAK), Papua New Guinea (PNG), Sierra Leone (SLE), Somalia (SOM), Sri Lanka (LKA), the Sudan (SDN), Tajikistan (TJK), Togo 
(TGO), Uzbekistan (UZB), Yemen, Rep. (YEM), Zimbabwe (ZWE). 
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Note: Country abbreviations: Afghanistan (AFG), Angola (AGO), Azerbaijan (AZE), Bangladesh (BGD), Burundi (BDI), Cambodia (KHM), Cameroon (CMR) Central African 
Republic (CAF), Chad (TCD), Congo, Dem. Rep. (ZAR), Congo, Rep. (COG), Côte d'Ivoire (CIV), Dominican Republic (DOM), Eritrea (ERI), Ethiopia (ETH), Georgia (GEO), 
Guinea (GIN), Haiti (HTI), Indonesia (IDN), Kenya (KEN), Kyrgyz Republic (KGZ), Laos PDR (LAO), Liberia (LBR), Mali (MLI), Mauritania (MRT), Myanmar (MMR), Nepal 
(NPL), Niger (NER), Nigeria (NGA), Pakistan (PAK), Papua New Guinea (PNG), Sierra Leone (SLE), Somalia (SOM), Sri Lanka (LKA), the Sudan (SDN), Tajikistan (TJK), Togo 
(TGO), Uzbekistan (UZB), Yemen, Rep. (YEM), Zimbabwe (ZWE). 
Source: World Development Indicators (2008); own calculations. Kenneth Harttgen and Stephan Klasen 
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LKA 1
NGA 3 HTI 5
BDI 5





PAK 1 ZAR 6
GEO 1
LBR 3 CAF 7MMR 2PNG 4 TGO 4 YEM 3
NER 2 ETH 1
SDN 8 SLE 5 TCD 7
AZE 1
IDN 1




COG 7 CIV 3





















































Note: Country abbreviations: Afghanistan (AFG), Angola (AGO), Azerbaijan (AZE), Bangladesh (BGD), Burundi (BDI), Cambodia (KHM), Cameroon (CMR) Central African 
Republic (CAF), Chad (TCD), Congo, Dem. Rep. (ZAR), Congo, Rep. (COG), Côte d'Ivoire (CIV), Dominican Republic (DOM), Eritrea (ERI), Ethiopia (ETH), Georgia (GEO), 
Guinea (GIN), Haiti (HTI), Indonesia (IDN), Kenya (KEN), Kyrgyz Republic (KGZ), Laos PDR (LAO), Liberia (LBR), Mali (MLI), Mauritania (MRT), Myanmar (MMR), Nepal 
(NPL), Niger (NER), Nigeria (NGA), Pakistan (PAK), Papua New Guinea (PNG), Sierra Leone (SLE), Somalia (SOM), Sri Lanka (LKA), the Sudan (SDN), Tajikistan (TJK), Togo 
(TGO), Uzbekistan (UZB), Yemen, Rep. (YEM), Zimbabwe (ZWE). 
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